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Abstract 
When it originated in the late 19th century, psychometrics was a field with both a scientific and a social 
mission: psychometrics provided new methods for research into individual differences, and at the same 
time, these psychometric instruments were considered a means to create a new social order. In contrast, 
contemporary psychometrics - due to its highly technical nature and its limited involvement in substantive 
psychological research - has created the impression of being a value-free discipline. In this article, we 
develop a contrasting characterization of contemporary psychometrics as a value-laden discipline. We 
expose four such values: that individual differences are quantitative (rather than qualitative), that 
measurement should be objective in a specific sense, that test items should be fair, and that utility of a 
model is more important than its truth. Our goal is not to criticize psychometrics for employing these 
values, but rather to bring them into the open and to show that these values are not inevitable and are in 
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1. Introduction 
Psychometrics - the discipline concerned with the measurement and prediction of psychological 
traits, aptitudes, and behavior - plays a central role in scientific psychology, educational measurement, 
and the structure of our current society (Lemann, 1999; Borsboom & Wijsen, 2017). Despite the evident 
social relevance of psychometrics, however, it is typically regarded as a largely technical discipline 
organized around the analysis of psychometric test data. This portrayal of psychometrics, as a 
conventional academic discipline whose primary goals appear to be purely scientific, makes it harder to 
detect any deeper political or social allegiances. This is remarkable, because through the work of its 
founding figures, psychometrics has traditionally been deeply invested in social and political projects, 
such as the eugenics movement, the introduction of military testing during the world wars, and the rise of 
a national education system (Evans & Waites, 1981; Sokal, 1987; Cerezo, 1991; Jones & Thissen, 2007). 
As a result, its methods and tools have been explicitly geared towards furthering the goals of these 
movements. So has psychometrics shaken off its ideological feathers? In keeping with recent work in the 
history and philosophy of science, which has uncovered value judgements across many areas of applied 
and theoretical science, we argue that this is not the case. Despite its technical appearance, social and 
ethical allegiances exist even in the most technical areas of psychometrics, right down to the structure of 
some of its central mathematical formulae. Importantly, this establishes that psychometrics is a socially 
and politically value-laden scientific discipline, whose statistical methods and assumptions partly reflect 
value systems, and should be evaluated as such.  
As all concepts, the meaning of the word ‘psychometrics’ is fluid and fuzzy and has no clear 
boundaries. When we speak of psychometrics in this paper, we do not intend to cover psychometrics in all 
its shapes and forms. To focus the discussion, therefore, we adopt a specific conceptualization of 
psychometrics: psychometrics as discussed here is the discipline concerned with the construction of 
abstract statistical models that can be used in psychological or educational research but have no particular 
interpretation in terms of specific psychological attributes (in contrast, to, e.g., mathematical psychology, 
which constructs models for specific psychological systems). As such, as the terminology is intended in 
this paper, psychometricians tend to work on the technical aspects of psychometric models, as used in 
Item Response Theory (IRT) and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). The Psychometric Society is the 
institution that best represents this field and Psychometrika, its flagship journal, is the primary vehicle for 
publishing research on the technical or statistical features of psychometric models. Typically, models in 
these areas of research model the relationship between a latent variable, which may represent any 
psychological construct, and the items that this variable purportedly measures. To draw a sharp contrast: 
psychometrics, as we understand the term here, mostly focuses on developing the technical aspects of 
these models (e.g., model extensions, methods for parameter estimation, methods for model fit 
VALUES IN PSYCHOMETRICS 
4 
assessment). This work is not to be confused with the application of these models to a construct of interest 
(e.g., cognitive abilities, personality dimensions, or psychological disorders) and its relation to other 
psychological or social attributes. For the sake of clarity, we will denote this subfield as ‘psychometrics’ 
in the remainder of this article, all the while recognising that not everyone who identifies themselves as a 
psychometrician may share a focus on this strictly technical approach1.   
What does it mean to say that psychometrics is or is not value-laden? Value judgements in science 
are typically understood to be those explicit claims or implicit commitments that enable inference and 
theorising where empirical or logical constraints do not uniquely compel any answer and where a wider 
range of considerations get deployed in order to advance research programs (Longino, 1996). Some value 
judgments are claims about what inference or theory is most predictive, most explanatory, or is 
empirically adequate; these are known as epistemic values, as they are values that relate primarily to the 
pursuit of knowledge. Value judgments about what is considered good, right, just, or beautiful are known 
as non-epistemic values (Douglas, 2000, 2009; Rooney, 1992). According to proponents of the value-free 
ideal, non-epistemic values do not have a place in science since they are not constitutive of knowledge or 
truth. However, recent philosophy of science recognises a variety of ways in which epistemic and non-
epistemic value judgments enter both pure and applied scientific research at all stages, from research 
planning to hypothesis testing (Douglas, 2009; Elliott, 2017). In the present paper, we argue that this 
characterization also holds for psychometrics. Combining these terminological conventions, we speak of 
psychometrics as value-laden in the sense that the practice of psychometrics, whether theoretical or 
applied, routinely involves the use of value judgements. More specifically, we use ‘value-laden’ to pick 
out two features: a) value judgments have a non-epistemic as well as epistemic character, and b) value 
judgments enter into the construction and appraisal of psychometric models and hypotheses, not just prior 
decisions about what to research or how to apply existing knowledge. Consequently, when we speak of 
psychometrics as having a ‘value-free’ image we mean the denial (or the failure to recognise) (a) and (b) 
above.  
Values in psychological science have been addressed on a number of occasions. For example, 
some studies investigate the need for diversity of political preferences in academic psychology (Duarte et 
al., 2015; Redding, 2001), other studies investigate how psychology can become a more socially engaged, 
 
1 This precisification of ‘psychometrics’ as the technical, model-based discipline (not as psychometric 
applications) is a strategic choice on our part. The role of value judgments in applications of 
psychometrics is by now familiar - after all these applications typically have social motivations to 
improve education or human resources management. This is why famous critiques, such as Stephen Jay 
Gould’s Mismeasure of Man, tend to focus on specific applications, e.g., in making the connection 
between racism and intelligence research. So to show that applied psychometrics is value-laden hardly 
counts as newsworthy. On the contrary, showing value judgments at work in pure theory is unexpected 
and therefore newsworthy. 
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or socially conscious, discipline (Gergen, 1973; Nafstad & Blakar, 2012). There are also several studies 
that address the role of values in the process of educational measurement and standardized testing. These 
are normative endeavours strongly laden with judgments about what is worthy, proper, or suitable, 
especially in high stake situations (like college admissions) or when those qualities themselves are 
considered especially desirable (Stein, 2014). Moral values are also strongly visible in what we consider 
‘pre-psychometrics’; the process of deciding which abilities and aptitudes are important and in need of 
measurement (a process which lies more in the hands of policymakers and applied psychologists than in 
the hands of psychometricians themselves). Values in the realm of testing, such as the ideas of social 
justice or equal opportunity, have been discussed by several authors (Gordon & Terrell, 1981; Messick, 
1975, 1989). However, the role of value judgments in contemporary psychometrics, and specifically how 
they are embedded in much of the technical aspects of psychometric research, has not been explored in 
the literature so far and is our focus in this article. 
Our strategy is to distinguish and illustrate four senses of value-ladenness in contemporary 
psychometrics: the conceptualization of individual differences as quantitative (rather than qualitative), the 
aim for objectivity in measurement, the aim for fairness in measurement, and the preference for utility 
above truth. All four might look like scientific commitments rather than value judgments. We argue that, 
when commitments such as objectivity (i.e., the removal of personal judgement) are endorsed in 
psychometrics, these are not evidence of value-freedom. Instead, they in part embody the endorsement of 
a specific social value, such as seeking to remove personal judgment - as far as possible - from the testing 
process and to substitute it with a combination of good assessment procedures and proper data analysis. In 
doing so, today’s methods of modeling are most naturally aligned with the ideal of a meritocratic society, 
in which people’s role in society can be assigned on the basis of measurable characteristics pertaining to 
their abilities. We should thus resist the temptation to view these value judgments as somehow inevitable, 
inherent, and fundamental, such that psychometrics would not be psychometrics without them. Each of 
these value judgments is contingent, rather than necessary, and each of them could very well have been 
different. To show this, we trace for each four that there were historical reasons for adopting them and 
that there were and still exist precedents for alternative value judgments. 
In articulating the ways in which even the most technical work in psychometrics involves value 
judgements, our goal is not to criticise the discipline, nor to expose it as somehow biased and failing to 
live up to ideals of science. Any inquiry needs to make the sort of foundational bets we attribute to 
psychometrics, for without them the scientific work cannot get started. However, exactly what 
commitments a discipline adopts are neither inevitable, nor innocent. Making them explicit will hopefully 
stimulate more discussion on the implementation of moral values in psychometric research and thereby 
contribute to a more reflective psychometric practice in psychological science and society.   
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2. ‘Value-free’ state-of-the-art psychometrics.  
Before we show how social values permeate psychometric research, we will first motivate the 
methodology we adopt, and explain why contemporary psychometrics cultivates a value-free image.  
A full investigation of values in this field, even when defined in our narrow sense, would require 
a wide array of evidence (e.g., interviews, survey data, citation analysis). As a starting point for such an 
investigation, our contribution adopts a methodology common in philosophy of science, in which values 
of a field are inferred from the commitments implicit in its exemplary projects and theories2. This does 
not mean that individual psychometricians hold these attitudes at a personal level, only that these 
commitments underlie their theoretical work and without these commitments this work does not make 
sense. Similarly, when we speak about the value-free image of psychometrics, we mean the shared 
impression that psychometrics is free of those commitments. There are of course limits to this 
methodology, since it does not pick up on the attitudes of individual psychometricians that cannot be 
deduced from their publications, nor can we speak for the entire scope of psychometrics. Nevertheless, 
because we show that values are already detectable at this very theoretical and technical level of 
psychometric research, we hypothesize that they will also be more easily detectable at more applied 
levels.  
 Exposing the values in psychometrics means putting pressure on its value-free self-conception. 
Below, we see three observable manifestations of this self-conception. First, psychometric research tends 
to focus on the technical and statistical features of psychometric models, rather than substantive 
interpretations of these models. The modeling traditions of IRT and SEM are two of its main focus areas, 
and examples of important projects in contemporary psychometrics are Computerized Adaptive Testing - 
a form of computer-based testing which adapts the items to the examinee’s ability level often based on 
IRT principles -, Bayesian estimation of psychometric models, methods for model evaluation and 
comparison, and response time analysis. Psychometrika, psychometrics’ flagship journal, is a mainly 
theoretical and technical journal, with an emphasis on the statistical aspects of (often highly specialized) 
methods and models, and articles in Psychometrika are known to be fiendishly technical and difficult to 
understand for researchers who lack advanced statistical or psychometric education. Though there have 
been efforts to open up Psychometrika to a larger, more applied audience - Psychometrika has a new 
Application Reviews and Case Studies section - its coverage has remained largely devoid of 
psychological contentost Psychometrika publications focus on the technical and statistical aspects of 
 
2 Such a methodology is adopted by many high profile studies of values in science, including Anderson 
(2004), Keller & Longino (1996), Lloyd (1993), and Longino (2020). For example, Lloyd 1993 shows 
that studies of female orgasm assume that orgasm is necessarily linked to reproduction and in this sense 
implicitly adopt the value of androcentrism. 
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models and research methods rather than specific substantive interpretations. Correspondingly, latent 
variables, once considered innate ‘measurable’ entities (Spearman, 1904), are now often considered 
purely statistically (e.g., as random effects or as summaries of the data; Jonas & Markon, 2016), 
convenient for the process of modeling and estimation but not a reference to an existing psychological 
attribute. Importantly, Psychometrika is a journal that contains papers written by specialist authors for 
specialist readers; although individual authors and editors may labour to make its contents accessible to a 
wider audience, such accessibility is clearly not a core goal of the journal. In contrast, Psychological 
Methods, a journal that publishes a wide variety of article types on quantitative methods in psychology - 
among which psychometric methods, but not exclusively so -, explicitly encourages authors to make their 
work understandable to applied researchers.  
Because of Psychometrika’s focus on technical issues, psychologists and other applied 
researchers may be inclined to leave the highly technical psychometric literature for what it is, and on 
their turn, psychometricians may not always be sensitive to the problems of applied research (Sijtsma, 
2009; Young, 1996). This reciprocal lack of involvement with the other party contributes to the status of 
psychometrics as a field without a very strong connection to substantive psychological research. And 
being such an abstract and technical field has made the detection of an explicit political agenda (if there is 
any) in this research difficult. Contemporary psychometric research thus invites the impression of being a 
field with no apparent social mission and with only technical tools to offer. This impression motivates the 
idea that contemporary psychometrics is value-free. 
A second manifestation of psychometrics’ apparent value-freedom is shown by the departure of 
validity - the core term that connects psychometric models to substantive applications (Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955; Messick, 1989; Kane, 2006; Borsboom & Markus, 2018) - from the psychometric jargon 
used in journals like Psychometrika. ‘Validity’ became a frequently used term in psychometric literature 
in the 1910s and 1920s (Newton & Shaw, 2014), and was conceptualized by psychometrician Truman 
Kelley as “whether a test really measures what it purports to measure” (1927, p. 14). Witnessing the rise 
of intelligence tests, Kelley found it important to be careful about drawing bold conclusions about a 
person’s attributes, and argued that it was first and foremost important to know whether a test indeed 
measures what it aims to measure before one draws these conclusions. The definition of validity has gone 
through a number of changes, and several contemporary definitions emphasize that validity is not only a 
matter of whether a test actually measures the construct of interest (i.e. test validity; Borsboom, 
Mellenbergh, & Van Heerden, 2004), but also a matter of sufficient evidence that supports specific 
interpretations and uses of a test (Kane, 2001).  
Though psychometricians still care about validity in a general sense - they would agree that it is 
of vital importance that measures are thoroughly checked for validity - validity is no longer a common 
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research topic in contemporary psychometrics. To illustrate: between 2000 and 2019, only one original 
article and one book review in Psychometrika were devoted to validity (compared to hundreds in other 
psychology journals), whereas between 1940 and 1959 the number of articles concerning validity in 
Psychometrika passed the fifteen. So even though validity is possibly one of the best-known and most 
exported concepts in psychometrics, and still a value for psychometricians themselves, the discussion of 
what validity entails and how to establish it has largely moved away from psychometrics proper. Instead, 
this debate takes place in educational and psychological research (e.g., Moss, 1995; Kane, 2001; Newton 
& Shaw, 2014), and philosophy of science (e.g., Alexandrova & Haybron, 2016; Markus & Borsboom, 
2013; Stone, 2019). The departure of validity from psychometric discourse could be interpreted as a sign 
of psychometrics’ increasingly instrumentalist approach. 
A third aspect of contemporary psychometrics’ apparent value-freedom resides in the fact that it 
does not endorse particular uses of testing for social purposes and does not recommend any particular 
educational or workplace policies. The debate on the role of tests and assessments in society is part of 
public discourse both in the United States and the Netherlands (two of psychometrics’ strongholds), but is 
mostly led by policymakers and education reformers (not by psychometricians). Psychometricians 
certainly work for institutions that promote standardized testing, like the Educational Testing Service 
(ETS) in the US or the Centraal Instituut voor Toets Ontwikkeling (CITO) in the Netherlands, but do not 
often engage in the debate on whether standardized testing is indeed a desirable development (a debate 
that is now again in full swing with UCLA rejecting the SATs as part of the admission procedure). The 
lack of participation of psychometricians is to be expected, considering that historians of the field 
attribute to it an ideal called ‘technocratic rationality’ (Evans & Waites, 1981). According to Evans and 
Waites (1981), this ideal commands that any problems be solved within the framework of the technology 
itself. Seen as technocratic rationality, psychometric research focuses on mostly technical and statistical 
problems that need to be solved and does not concern itself with long term goals in terms of desirable 
social, economic, and political development. A more recent illustration of this idea is an argument by 
psychometrician Klaas Sijtsma (2006) that psychometrics is unable to “replace substantive theorizing 
about intelligence or personality for designing good measurement instruments; it can only give support” 
(p. 454). The focus of psychometrics as a discipline is thus in solving the technical parts and with that 
supporting the psychologists or applied researchers, rather than engaging in substantive theory or the 
social and political interests that follow from their work.  
The apparent value-freedom of contemporary psychometrics thus follows from psychometrics’ 
highly technical content, its somewhat isolated existence from applied research, and its tendency to 
operate within the constraints of technocratic rationality. Crucially for our argument the field has not 
always entertained or cultivated a value-free image. Early psychometricians and founders of the field, 
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among whom scholars like Francis Galton, Lewis Terman, James McKeen Cattell, and Charles Spearman, 
often incorporated explicit commitments about how psychometrics could and should be used for certain 
social or political purposes. For example, following a eugenic ideology that many early psychologists 
upheld, psychometric measurement was considered a tool to set up the ‘ideal’ society, where intelligence 
measurement would have an incremental role in setting up a meritocratic hierarchy, eliminating crime, 
and in deciding who was encouraged to procreate and who was discouraged from doing so. The shift that 
we see here - from a psychometrics that is committed to larger political projects, to a psychometrics that 
is a largely technical discipline without such explicit commitments - shows that psychometrics has not 
always abstained from making value commitments and that the use and interpretation of particular values 
does not follow naturally from the discipline itself. In this paper, we will argue however that the value-
free image of contemporary psychometrics is incorrect and that values are in fact woven into both early 
and contemporary psychometric research. We will show how different values permeate and inform the 
practice of psychometric research, and illustrate how the particular use of values in psychometrics is 
never an inevitable consequence but a choice of the researchers in a particular discipline.  
 
3. Values in psychometrics. 
To show that the value-free conception of psychometrics is inaccurate, we discuss four values 
that permeate psychometric decision making in different ways: the conceptualization of individual 
differences as having quantitative (not qualitative) structure, the aim for objective measurement, the 
formalization of fairness of items, and the preference of utility above truth. Though we treat these values 
separately, there are areas of overlap, which we will highlight as we go through the analysis. Our strategy 
is, first, to show that a widely accepted method or a common assumption of psychometrics exhibits one or 
more of the value judgments above, and second, using examples from the history of psychometrics, 
emphasise that this particular value judgment is not inevitable and that there exist precedents for 
alternative values. 
 
3.1 Individual differences are quantitative, not qualitative 
Psychometrics is traditionally committed to investigating individual differences in a quantitative 
fashion. Individuals are typically considered to be ordered by their values on a measured attribute, and the 
differences between them are quantitative - that is, if two individuals differ in intelligence or a scholastic 
aptitude like reading ability, one of them is assumed to have more of it than the other, rather than having a 
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different kind of ability (Michell, 2000). Psychometric models, and especially Rasch models3, clearly 
reflect this assumption (Bond & Fox, 2015), and this commitment has not significantly changed over 
time. In fact, for the most part, psychometrics is still dedicated to developing models for quantitative 
measurement. We argue that the choice for conceptualizing individual differences as quantitative, not 
qualitative differences, involves two values: the value that only quantitative knowledge counts as properly 
scientific, and a moral commitment to a specific form of equality, namely that differences between human 
beings are only of degree and not of kind. Let us illustrate each in turn. 
The ‘quantitative imperative’ holds that proper science is always quantitative and is often 
epitomized in Lord Kelvin’s “When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in 
numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in 
numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind” (Kelvin, 1889). The quantitative 
imperative has been argued to have influenced early psychology (Michell, 2003). This is visible in the 
work of early psychometricians. For example, Francis Galton believed that the only means to a scientific 
approach to the study of the mind is the measurement of quantitative differences (Galton, 1879) 
Quantitative research had proven successful in the natural sciences, and psychometricians were confident 
that it would also become the method to investigate laws of the human mind. McKeen Cattell’s first two 
sentences in his 1890 article illustrate this ardent belief:  
 
Psychology cannot attain the certainty and exactness of the physical sciences unless it rests on a  
 foundation of experiments and measurement. A step in this direction could be made by applying a 
 series of mental tests and measurements to a large number of individuals. (p. 373) 
 
The view that a quantitative approach makes research more rigorous and reliable, and thus more 
scientific, has since been a guiding principle of much psychometric research.4 The journal Psychometrika 
is still ‘devoted to the development of psychology as a quantitative rational science [...]’, and most articles 
in this journal concern quantitative and statistical methods. By conceptualizing abilities and aptitudes as 
quantitative attributes, and by developing quantitative methods to analyze and measure these abilities, 
both early and contemporary psychometricians have aimed at drawing what they saw as uniquely reliable 
conclusions about individual differences.  
 
3 The Rasch model is a psychometric model for analyzing dichotomous data (which are often 
correct/incorrect item responses) as a function of a person’s ability and item difficulty and which has been 
claimed to instantiate measurement on equal footing with that in the natural sciences (Bond & Fox, 2015). 
4 Though psychometricians mostly engage in quantitative research and consider that it is important to do 
so for the reliability of psychological science, we do not mean to say here that according to 
psychometricians, there is no place for qualitative research in psychology.  
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 It may be tempting to view the quantitative assumption as somehow inevitable and inherent to 
psychometrics, such that psychometrics would not be itself without it. We resist this temptation. There 
have been a number of more qualitatively oriented approaches in psychometrics worth mentioning 
(though these still rely on statistical methods, and are not qualitative in the sense of gathering non-
numerical data). One example is Thurstone’s theory of primary mental abilities, which assumes that 
intelligence does not consist of one factor, but multiple independent factors (Thurstone, 1938). Though 
people differ on these factors in terms of degree, there is also qualitative differentiation: every person has 
an individual ‘profile’ of levels on the different factors, i.e., a pattern of scores rather than a single score. 
A second example is the Aptitude x Treatment interaction which investigates how different methods of 
instruction interact with student ability and achievement (Cronbach & Webb, 1975); in certain cases, 
these differences can be qualitative in the sense that the functional form of intervention effects depends on 
the aptitude (e.g., when able students benefit from a teaching method, while it has an adverse effects on 
less able students). There has also been the occasional psychometric model for qualitative differences, 
which assumes a discrete, rather than continuous, latent variable (e.g., the latent class model). A class in 
such a model accounts for a specific pattern of item responses. These models however are not mainstream 
in psychometrics (in the issues of 2018 and 2019, only two Psychometrika articles address latent class 
models, and the assumption that individual differences are quantitative still form the vast majority of 
Psychometrika publications)5. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the latent class model originates in the work of 
sociologists Lazarsfeld & Henry (1968), not in psychometrics, and Cronbach & Webb (1975) was 
published in the more theory-oriented Journal of Educational Psychology, not in the more technical 
Psychometrika. All in all, it is safe to state that the assumption of quantity has won out in psychometrics, 
even though there have been dissenters. 
So far so uncontroversial. Less appreciated is that, in addition to being a commitment about 
proper scientific method, the commitment to quantity also has a moral dimension - in particular, the 
commitment to quantification can be seen as a commitment to a form of equality. This moral component 
becomes clear when we consider there were times when differences between people were characterized 
qualitatively to indicate inferiority of certain groups. An 18th century US slave owner would not have 
agreed with the idea that the difference between him and his slave is a difference in degree. The slave 
after all was considered a kind of animal; an entirely different species that was inferior to the white man 
 
5 An exception here is the field of cognitive diagnosis (Junker & Sijtsma, 2001), which is a model that 
combines quantitative traits with latent class models to identify whether a student has acquired a specific 
skill. Cognitive diagnosis models have become increasingly popular and are well represented in a journal 
like Psychometrika.  
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(especially with regard to cognitive abilities)6. Similarly, the Nazis typically held qualitative differences 
in high regard: they considered Jewish and Roma people to be subhuman (Steizinger, 2018). To say that 
the difference between people is a matter of degree, rather than of kind, is to negate these absolute 
differences. In this sense, it codes the idea that in essence, we are all equal. The sense of equality here is 
thus the fundamental equality in the kind of creatures we are and hence the endowments we all have, even 
though the levels of these endowments can differ person by person. This may sound ironic, since a core 
goal of psychometric applications is to differentiate people inrankings - one of its core parameters is 
actually literally a discrimination parameter that indicates how well particular items perform in this 
respect - which typically result in unequal outcomes for those involved. Besides, it is very hard to 
attribute a commitment to equality to the early practitioners of psychometrics who were in search of a 
superior race and a superior gene pool. This irony notwithstanding, today’s psychometricians adhere to a 
particular type of equality where (cognitive) differences between people are a matter of a degree, while at 
the same time rejecting the embarrassing allegiances of their predecessors.  
In addition to the moral and the epistemic justifications for quantification, there is also a deeply 
practical one: numerical rankings enable psychometricians to give pithy summaries of enormous amounts 
of data and information about individuals. As we shall see in section 4.4, the commitment to being 
‘practical’ is another crucial commitment of contemporary psychometrics. Comparing people’s abilities 
on a quantitative scale is highly practical and often more effective than if we had conceptualized 
differences between people qualitatively. Decisions based on qualitative data are typically hard to trace, 
not very transparent, and as such do not easily lend themselves to psychometric analysis. This aligns with 
Porter’s well-known argument that quantification “minimizes the need for intimate knowledge and 
personal trust” (1995, p. ix), and aids communication about the objects of this quantification beyond the 
community itself. We can directly compare students on the measured trait, observe who has a higher level 
of intelligence or other cognitive skills, and based on that, make a decision who is accepted into college 
and who is not.  
The commitment to quantity in psychometrics is not one justified to everyone’s satisfaction. It 
has been argued that there is no strong evidence that attributes are in fact quantitative in nature even 
though psychometricians treat psychological attributes as such (Michell, 1999; 2000; 2008). Michell 
argues that the stance of the psychometrician here is even pathological: psychometricians ignore the 
alternative hypothesis that an attribute is not quantitative, which is a sign of bad science. We do not wish 
to argue here that psychometrics is indeed a pathological science (for a counterargument see Borsboom & 
 
6 See James and Burgos (2020) for the history of the idea of polygenesis, the hypothesis that different 
races have different origins. Also see Zack (2002) for an extensive overview of the history and 
philosophy of race.  
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Mellenbergh, 2004), but what this angle does show is that it is not a priori the case that psychological 
attributes ought to be treated in a quantitative fashion. Michell (2019) elaborates on the interesting case of 
philosopher R. G. Collingwood, who was a strong opponent of the dominant quantitative stance in 
psychophysics and psychometrics. Collingwood argued that a psychological attribute like heat sensations 
can be seen as a combination of degree and kind as heat experience varies “from a faint warmth through a 
decided warmth it passes to a definite heat, first pleasant, then dully painful; the heat at one degree 
soothes me, at another excites me, at another torments me” (Collingwood, 1933, p. 72). While the heat 
increases by degree (Collingwood does not deny that many attributes in physics differ quantitatively), our 
heat sensations differ in kind (our experience is not just that the temperature rises, but also that it goes 
from a pleasant, to an uncomfortable, to a highly painful sensation). Importantly, our point here is not to 
argue that Collingwood was right and that psychometricians were wrong. From a psychometrician’s point 
of view, there are certainly several objections thinkable as to why a qualitative conceptualization is both 
morally, scientifically, and practically undesirable. For example, how would one build a fair and reliable 
measurement procedure if one can no longer compare people on a single scale? However, Collingwood’s 
example here shows that, regardless of these objections, the quantification of psychological attributes 
does not follow naturally from some objective reality psychometricians aim to describe, but that there is a 
history of psychology and psychometrics imaginable with a weaker (or perhaps even lack of) emphasis on 
individual differences as quantitative differences.  
In sum, the quantification of individual differences has both a moral and an epistemic component: 
the moral component being the idea of equality of standards, and the epistemic component being the 
centrality of quantification to rigorous science. The strong adherence to quantification in psychometrics 
also enables the psychometrician to claim a very specific ideal of objectivity to which we turn now. 
 
3.2 Objectivity 
Objectivity is perhaps the quintessential epistemic value in all sciences, whether natural or social. 
As recent work in history and philosophy of science shows, objectivity has several meanings and which 
of these meanings is prized is highly contingent on the history and the context (Douglas, 2004; Daston & 
Galison, 2007). Objectivity can mean being true to nature from God’s eye point of view, or it can mean 
restricting personal preferences or desires of the inquirer, or may amount to just following transparent and 
mechanical procedures (e.g., the open science movement; Nosek et al., 2015) . There is no one true 
definition, and exactly which of the many definitions a discipline settles on can reveal a great deal about 
its identity. Psychometrics is no exception, and the definition of objectivity it adopts is motivated by 
considerations that are very specific to psychometrics: this field places a huge premium on avoiding the 
risk that a personal judgement taints measurement and testing process (i.e. how performance is mapped to 
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a dimension).7 The personal judgments by individuals can be informed by factors that have little to do 
with an examinee’s ability, such as the examinee’s gender, religion or social class, or simply by a general 
dislike for the examinee. Psychometricians reject all evaluations in which teachers exclusively rely on 
their own judgement, rather than on objective sources such as test scores. To ensure objectivity in this 
sense psychometricians develop assessment procedures that control for possible biases.  
In the history of psychometrics, we see the importance of objectivity in the work of Charles 
Spearman. These methods had turned out successful in the natural sciences, and were now bound to turn 
the social sciences into an objective and rigorous endeavour. His mission was to contribute to 
“psychology of a more exact character” (Spearman, 1914, p. 25), in which abilities can be “definitely 
measured and permanently recorded”, rather than being estimated by “hearsay, causal experience, and 
remote reminiscence”. Spearman was a member of the Eugenic Society and considered general 
intelligence to be the basis of social institutions (Spearman, 1914; 1927). Charles Spearman was the first 
to use the quantitative Galtonian and Pearsonian techniques, such as correlation and regression, for 
modeling intelligence. In his 1904 paper, appropriately called “General Intelligence”, Objectively 
determined and measured, Spearman formalized the relationship between general intelligence (g) and the 
test items that are supposed to measure this attribute in his common factor model. Spearman thus had a 
strong scientific curiosity to uncover the structure of the mind through the use of objective, statistical 
methods that did not rely on human judgment, and his common factor model was a good match with the 
politics of eugenics: Spearman considered general intelligence to be a hereditary quality that resided in 
the brain (though he was unsure where exactly), and the common factor model could contribute to 
measuring people’s intelligence in an objective fashion and to shaping a society that was ordered based on 
this quality. In the words of Spearman himself:  
 
Thus, it is to be hoped, we shall eventually reach our pedagogical conclusions, not by easy 
subjective theories, nor by the insignificant range of personal experiences, nor yet by some 
catchpenny exceptional cases, but rather by an adequately representative array of established facts 
(p. 277).  
 
The importance of objectivity for Spearman - making judgments about people’s level of skills 
based on evidence rather than our faulty subjective reasoning - has since remained an important aspect of 
 
7 Note that there also exist a number of approaches in psychometrics that aim at quantifying or 
formalizing human judgement, so that human judgement becomes more reliable (and thus less prone to 
error). Examples of these approaches are Generalizability theory (Cronbach, Rajaratnam, & Gleser, 1963) 
and interrater reliability (e.g., Cohen, 1960).  
VALUES IN PSYCHOMETRICS 
15 
psychometric research and has received further scrutiny. In contemporary psychometrics however, 
objectivity has received a more specific definition. According to Rasch modelers, for instance, the 
concept of objectivity is operationalized in terms of the interchangeability of sources of evidence, as it 
holds that judgments about a person’s ability, and decisions based upon these judgments, should be 
invariant under a particular change of perspective, namely, they should not depend on which items or 
raters are used to base the decision on. The requirement that conclusions should be invariant under 
exchanging observers, raters, interviewers, or items is made explicit in several formal definitions of 
psychometric models. For example, in the basic unidimensional latent variable model (Mellenbergh, 
1994), it does not matter (except for measurement error) which particular items are used to arrive at 
conclusions regarding the ordering of individuals (Grayson, 1988). Perhaps the best-known instance of 
this property is Rasch’ concept of specific objectivity (1967; 1968; 1977): the requirement that the 
comparison of persons should not depend on which items are chosen and vice versa (see also Fischer, 
1987). Similarly, Junker & Ellis (1997) conceptualized the idea of exchangeability of psychometric items. 
Along similar lines, decisions should not depend on any particular person (a rater, in psychometric 
jargon; Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda & Rajaratnam, 1972). Objectivity in psychometrics thus means the 
removal, as far as possible, of any leeway and any freedom from the users and the administrators of a test, 
as well as the notion of specific objectivity or measurement invariance, in which the estimation of a 
person’s ability ‘must not depend on the items nor on the distribution and sampling of persons.’ (Kreiner, 
2007, p. 281).  
Since objectivity is often defined as the elimination of personal bias, it is tempting to see it as an 
epistemic value solely. However, it is a non-epistemic value too, since objectivity in psychometrics takes 
away the power of judgement from individuals, so that the power of judgement comes to rely on facts 
about a person’s ability rather than human judgement. Objectivity in psychometrics is thus a statement on 
where judgement ought to lie, namely, with science. As a consequence, when a psychological construct 
becomes objectified it falls within the reach and under technical control of psychometrics. It becomes an 
object at the psychometrician’s disposal. The objectivity of intelligence measurement opened the door to 
using it for a certain purpose, and in Spearmanian times, this meant creating a society where people with 
high intelligence were encouraged to have offspring and discouraging others to do so. Though eugenic 
ideology no longer has a common place in our politics, a meritocratic ideology certainly thrives in the 
United States and most of the Western world, and we widely use cognitive and intelligence tests to 
facilitate this ideology. Psychometrics as a discipline relies for its prestige and standing on being part of 
these practices. In this sense, although objectivity denotes a departure from values, it enables 
psychometrics to participate in projects of moral and political valence. The story is structurally similar for 
fairness to which we move on now. 




Both values discussed above, the aim for objective and quantitative measurements, can be 
interpreted in terms of specific kinds of fairness. Not only should measurement take place in an objective 
fashion to avoid any value judgments from people involved, but ultimately, the most qualified people 
should be awarded the highest test scores and be granted whatever was at stake (e.g., the job position or 
enrollment at a university). However, in the second half of the 20th century, there was a growing 
awareness that people with the highest ability do not automatically gain the highest test score, and that 
measurement instruments could in fact generate biases, even if the same items were used for all 
individuals.  
 In the first half of the 20th century, standardized testing was a means to support the eugenic 
beliefs at the time. The on average lower test scores of minorities like immigrants and African-Americans 
were attributed to their inferiority to the white race and were considered ‘proof’ of their lower potential 
and worth. Sources that could possibly explain these differences in test scores (such as lack of schooling 
or financial resources of specific groups, or items that discriminate between groups) were largely ignored. 
In the second half of the 20th century, awareness of unfairness in standardized tests increased. One of the 
key moments was the 1979 Larry P. - case, in which the American court decided that standardized IQ 
tests were racially biased against African-American children, who were, due to their lower scores, placed 
in inferior education settings, which in turn only increased their isolation from a suitable high-quality 
learning environment. This and other rulings resulted in a complete ban against administering IQ-tests to 
African-American children for any special education purpose (Frisby & Henry, 2016). The case of Larry 
P. and other lawsuits have contributed to the awareness among psychometricians that tests, and even 
items, can discriminate against specific groups (e.g., gender, cultural, or minority groups). Test or item 
bias became an important topic in psychometric research from the 1970s onwards.  
In psychometrics, bias is defined as the following: an item is biased when respondents, from 
different groups but with the same ability, show different probabilities for answering an item correctly 
(Mellenbergh, 1989). The statistical concept developed to identify biased items carries the name 
Differential Item Functioning, or DIF. DIF signals that the relevant item does not behave the same in 
different groups. When one or more items is affected by DIF and this has adverse consequences for a 
specific group, DIF implies item bias. In case of item bias, measurement is confounded by other 
(irrelevant) variables and thus cannot be considered completely objective in the psychometric sense 
(Kreiner, 2007). Psychometricians have developed various methods for identifying DIF (e.g., Holland & 
Wainer, 1993) and have written software packages so researchers could test for its presence (e.g., Shealy, 
Stout & Roussus, 1991). Bias as conceptualized in psychometrics thus involves a restricted sense of 
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fairness, which only pertains to the fairness of specific items or tests, not to a wider social or political 
fairness (see for example Broome (1990) for a radically different conception of fairness).  
In Structural Equation Modeling, an important element in reaching fair decisions was formalized 
as measurement invariance (Meredith, 1993), which means that, across groups, the instrument relates to 
the latent variable in the same way. In other words, the same measurement model holds in different 
groups. Whereas DIF is usually item-specific (though there are instances where groups of items rather 
than just one item are considered), measurement invariance denotes the complete absence of DIF in an 
entire test. Another example of fairness in psychometrics is test equating8, which is another main tradition 
in psychometric research. Some tests are administered repeatedly (like the SATs in the US), and test 
scores of these tests should be comparable across versions. As with DIF and measurement invariance, 
psychometricians would argue that test equating should be evaluated by using statistical methods. Though 
testing agencies like ETS also use a variety of non-psychometric methods when evaluating the fairness of 
a test, such as engaging external reviewers to help evaluate which items are unfair to marginalized groups, 
the methods mentioned above are central in evaluating the fairness of a test. Commentators on 
psychometrics widely recognise these (and other) conceptualisations of fairness in testing practice 
(Dorans & Cook, 2016).  
Though psychometricians have become more conscious of the possible unfairness in testing as 
illustrated by the many examples of tools to investigate fairness of tests, this has not led to a rejection of 
testing as such. Actually, the opposite is the case: standardized testing, now including methods for 
calculating some statistic that detects possibly biased items, is still considered one of psychometrics’ main 
contributions to society (Wijsen, forthcoming). A society that is not aware of the problems of fairness in 
testing, or worse, a society that does not endorse testing at all, is not aware of the danger of its 
alternatives. After all, standardized testing excludes several sources of potential bias that would naturally 
enter our judgement and it is likely that standardized testing has provided many people with opportunities 
that they otherwise would not have had.9  
As explained above, psychometrics provides a definition of fairness that is solely based on the 
relationship between a test instrument and people’s abilities, which can certainly be seen as an 
emancipatory development: what matters is a person’s level of ability, not other irrelevant factors. This 
 
8 Test equating is a statistical process to adjust test scores so that scores on different test forms are 
comparable and can be used interchangeably. See Kolen & Brennan (2014) for a comprehensive 
overview.  
9 Several authors would contest that standardized contributed to (racial) equality. For example, Au (2016) 
considers contemporary standardized testing a ‘racial project’. In this view, unfairness with regard to the 
test or items themselves might have been extensively researched, but standardized testing as a 
phenomenon still contributes to racial inequality because the actual sources of inequality between groups 
are not resolved.  
VALUES IN PSYCHOMETRICS 
18 
definition aligns well with our meritocratic society, in which we select people according to merit, and not 
according to their financial situation, family reputation, religion, or other variables that should not 
influence selection criteria. However, the measurement invariance definition as discussed above is not the 
only definition of fairness that is available in the literature and that has been put to use. A second 
definition formulated by Cleary (1968) is that a test is unbiased if the regression of some criterion on the 
test scores is equal for different groups. For example, if the criterion of interest is success in the first year 
of college, and the predictor are the scores on an intelligence test, a fair test would find similar regression 
equations in different groups (e.g., men and women). According to this definition, it is not necessary that 
the same measurement model holds in different groups (which is necessary for the measurement 
invariance definition of fairness). In fact, the measurement invariance definition is inconsistent with the 
prediction invariance definition: when the same measurement model holds in different groups 
(measurement invariance), the regression lines of the criterion regressed on test scores of these different 
groups cannot be the same (Millsap, 1997; 2007). In accordance, as a rule, the quality of selection in 
terms of sensitivity and specificity cannot hold under measurement invariance if the latent variable 
distributions differ across groups (Borsboom, Romeijn, & Wicherts, 2008; Heesen & Romeijn, 2019). A 
third alternative for a definition of fairness would be that a test is unbiased when a selected group entails 
an equal (or representative) distribution of members from different groups. For example, when selecting 
freshman students for college entry, it could be decided beforehand that, when conditionalized on ability, 
there should be an equal number of men and women and a representative number of people from different 
ethnic backgrounds among the selected students. A test is then defined as unbiased when the criteria 
decided upon beforehand hold.  
There are several arguments imaginable for or against each of these definitions (Borsboom, 
Romeijn & Wicherts, 2008). Fairness defined in the sense of equal distribution of different groups is 
radically different from the way measurement invariance fairness is defined: it accounts for the fact that 
some groups have fewer opportunities than other groups and ability is not the only factor that determines 
whether someone is admitted. One cannot decide between these options on technical criteria alone, and 
whichever definition of fairness in psychometrics one upholds likely involves a moral evaluation of how 
measurement and selection ought to take place. This is undoubtedly a value judgment and one that is 
intimately connected to the practical role of psychometric research, to which we now turn. 
 
3.4 Utility above truth. 
The final value judgment on which modern psychometrics depends is the primacy of practical 
utility of its models over their theoretical virtues. This commitment too has a history showing that it is not 
inevitable or uncontroversial that psychometrics should prize usability above truth. 
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Besides a genuine scientific interest in developing methods for the measurement of psychological 
attributes, many early psychologists and psychometricians saw the potential of psychometrics to also 
serve a social purpose. Psychometric instruments could in fact help arrange a new social order in society: 
an order that was genetic merit. This was inspired by eugenic ideology, founded by one of psychometrics’ 
ancestors Francis Galton. According to eugenic ideology, a population could and should be improved by 
encouraging people with desirable traits to procreate, and discouraging people with less desirable traits to 
do so10. According to several educational psychologists, like Henry Goddard and Lewis Terman, the 
standardized test could be considered a tool that identifies individuals with a higher eugenic worth 
(Stoskopf, 2002). The large-scale testing of immigrants at Ellis Island and military testing during World 
War I are both famous examples of how standardized testing was used to identify people with higher or 
lower eugenic worth. Shortly after the war, mental testing entered the educational system and was used to 
evaluate the abilities of millions of school-children. According to Lewis Terman - who introduced the 
first intelligence test for American children in 1916 (the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, a revision of 
the originally French Binet-Simon scale) and devised several other measurement instruments over the 
years - mental testing served the American meritocratic democratic ideal. He argued that “[...] the time 
has come when its [intelligence testing] wider use for more general purposes should be encouraged” 
(Terman, 1916, p. xi). Intelligence testing should thus not remain only a scientific endeavour, but one that 
could serve an important purpose in society as well.  
In this view, the utility of psychometric tools was defined as ensuring the welfare of American 
society, namely the education of people with high innate ability as picked out by mental tests (Minton, 
1987). Moreover, tests were expected to “bring tens of thousands of these high-grade defectives under the 
surveillance and protection of society” (Terman, 1916), so that crime and poverty could be eliminated. 
Psychologists and educational reformers considered mental testing the most effective method to reach a 
meritocratic social order, both in the sphere of education by measuring intelligence of both the retarded 
and the gifted, and in the sphere of criminology, to identify people with who were weak-minded and more 
prone to engage in criminal activities. In the words of Minton: ‘“Prediction and control”, “human 
engineering” and “social efficiency” were the catchphrases for postwar American psychology.’ (1987, p. 
106). The eugenic ideology of Terman, Yerkes, and Goddard - shared by many psychologists and 
educational reformers at the time - inspired a significant reform in education in which standardized tests 
became the new normal.  
 
10 Eugenics as described in this paper and especially with relation to psychometrics, was tied to racism 
and white supremacy. Note that eugenics still has a particular relevance for bioethics, in which such a 
relationship with racism is denied. There exists a continuing debate on whether selection for certain traits 
is in fact desirable in processes like genetic engineering and genetic enhancement (e.g., Anomaly, 2018; 
Savulescu & Kahane, 2009).  
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From the very early onset of psychometrics, psychometrics was thus considered a practical tool 
that could be used for specific social or political purposes, and this utilitarian aspect of psychometrics 
(though no longer inspired by eugenic ideology) has not changed much. Contemporary psychometricians 
still greatly value when research material finds its place in one or more applications. In fact, the 
possibility of application of psychometric research is sometimes perceived as more valuable than 
uncovering fundamental knowledge and building theory that perhaps has no immediate connection to 
such applications (Borsboom, 2006; Sijtsma, 2006). Rather than trying to explain human behavior, much 
contemporary psychometric research answers very practical questions. Is this test fair with respect to test-
takers from different cultural backgrounds? What is the best method to estimate a person’s ability? How 
do we control for a set of confounds? How can we compare the abilities of school children from different 
countries? Exceptions aside (e.g., explanatory item response theory; De Boeck & Wilson, 2004), most 
psychometric models usually do not aim at explanation. Psychometrics is thus relatively practical with 
regards to the question it answers and does not often seek a fundamental understanding of a mechanism. 
Knowledge for the sake of knowledge, or truth for the sake of truth, - a value in many of the sciences -, 
has gained little territory in contemporary psychometrics. Important to note here is that when we speak of 
utility above truth, it does not mean that psychometric research cannot indirectly contribute to 
psychological theory. Through psychometric models, psychologists can for instance formalize theories 
that explain human behavior, and a psychometrician might support the psychologist in that process, but 
for psychometric research itself, utility is more of a priority than truth.  
To illustrate the utility value in psychometrics, we can draw a comparison between psychometrics 
and an engineering approach (Thissen, 2001; Wilson & Gochyyev, 2013) - a comparison that has also 
been suggested for the field of economics (Roth, 2002). Wilson & Gochyyev (2013) argue that, similar to 
engineering, psychometrics builds or constructs objects (the measures) and then develops models to 
analyze these measures, which they call “reverse-engineering”. Psychometrics can thus be considered “a 
practical and engineering activity rather than as a basic science” (p. 3), in which basic science denotes 
seeking (fundamental) knowledge and understanding of mechanisms. Similar to engineering, one of the 
ultimate goals in psychometrics is that the research is used for building useful structures, such as new 
testing procedures, more advanced methods for data analysis in psychological science, or user-friendly 
software packages. And similar to engineering, these structures are considered more valuable than gaining 
fundamental knowledge of human psychology that has no direct link to practical output. The latter would 
be, in the case of engineering, the territory of the (theoretical) physicists, or in the case of psychometrics, 
the territory of the psychologists. This is not to say that there is no foundational research in 
psychometrics, or that psychometrics does not indirectly contribute to foundational psychological 
knowledge. Psychometrika especially publishes many articles on foundational problems in psychological 
VALUES IN PSYCHOMETRICS 
21 
measurement, and the tools that the psychometricians build can certainly be deployed to gain 
(psychological) knowledge. However, most foundational psychometric research is foundational in a 
statistical or mathematical sense rather than a psychological sense, and the way that psychometrics 
contributes to psychological knowledge is often indirect: psychometric models may be used for a variety 
of substantive issues but are not directly theoretically informed.  
Besides an emphasis on building new structures that add onto the already elaborate testing 
technology, psychometricians have also become increasingly focused on prediction and data analysis than 
on actual measurement. As mentioned previously, psychometricians themselves do not necessarily 
believe in the existence of psychological attributes, nor in the direct connection between reality and 
psychometric models (as in, psychometricians do not often expect that psychometric models can or 
should be interpreted realistically). To illustrate: Sijtsma (2006) characterizes latent variables as 
“summaries of the data, nothing more” (p. 452) and De Boeck (2008) considers them in a statistical 
fashion, i.e., as random effects. In other words, psychometricians often consider latent variables as 
properties of the data, rather than being real entities. Though psychometricians might refrain from a 
realist interpretation, they consider psychometric models to be useful for the analysis of all sorts of 
behavioral data, which are increasing in number and volume. So rather than being restricted to 
measurement as it was originally intended, many psychometric models can be used for a wide array of 
data analytic purposes. Since data analysis and prediction often have a practical motivation (e.g., data 
reduction or data visualization), the emphasis on data analysis and prediction in psychometrics aligns with 
the value of utility above truth. 
The value of utility over truth is one of the factors that separate psychometrics from mathematical 
psychology, a different quantitative research area in psychology that was once affiliated with 
psychometrics, but which has from the 1960s onwards developed independently (Van Zandt & 
Townsend, 2010). Both mathematical psychology and psychometrics heavily rely on mathematics and are 
model-based, but the use and interpretation of the models differ strongly. Models in mathematical 
psychology try to uncover laws or mechanisms that describe human behavior, mostly in the areas of 
perceptive and cognitive processes (Batchelder, 2010). So rather than a focus on individual differences 
and measurement, mathematical psychology aims at developing formal psychological theory about 
cognitive processes. The concept of truth is therefore more a priority for mathematical psychology, than it 
is for psychometrics. An important nuance here is that mathematical psychology possibly also adheres to 
Gigerenzer’s tools-to-theory heuristics (1991), which specify that many cognitive theories are inspired by 
the tools that scientists use in the process of doing research, such as statistics or computers. From that 
perspective, it could be said that theories developed in mathematical psychology are not only driven by 
truth, but also depend on practical, or utilitarian, aspects, and are in fact also a case of reverse 
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engineering. However, where mathematical psychologists aim for formal theories that describe specific 
cognitive processes, psychometric models often have a more data-analytic purpose and are easily 
transferable to all sorts of substantive or practical matters in (and even outside) psychological research. 
The notion of truth is therefore not as leading in psychometrics as it is in mathematical psychology, 
whereas the instrumentalist view - the goodness of a model is not in its ability to reflect reality but rather 
in its usefulness for various applications - corresponds more closely with modeling in psychometrics.  
Throughout the history of psychometrics, psychometrics has been used to solve practical or social 
problems. Though the nature of these problems has certainly changed - psychometric instruments are no 
longer used to select people with higher eugenic value -, psychometrics is still used for a broad range of 
selection and diagnostic purposes. The difference in moral code between early and contemporary 
psychometrics shows that the instrumentalist rhetoric of psychometrics is in fact a moral value: the kind 
of questions that are answered in psychometric research and the specific purpose that psychometric 
instruments are used for is a matter of what is considered valuable in a specific day and age and thus 
subject to change. An interesting example in contemporary psychometrics that shows how the purpose of 
psychometric models are in flux is the rise of diagnostic classification models, a type of latent class model 
which can be used to diagnose the type of skills that a student has or has not achieved (Rupp & Templin, 
2011). Rather than using estimates of ability as a means for selection, these models are often intended to 
provide teachers with additional diagnostic information about a student’s skills profile - considerable shift 
in purpose with regard to the more traditional selection purpose.  
 
4. What is to be done? 
Early psychometricians were devoted to a new social order: based on the measurement of 
people’s innate abilities, society would be redesigned so that people would hold the positions which they 
were meant to hold. The political and social motives of psychometrics have gradually faded over time, 
and in contemporary psychometrics - through its devotion to technological solutions and its absence from 
public debates - the illusion is created that psychometric research is free from any such values. In this 
article, we have argued that this idea is incorrect. Several values permeate psychometric research: a 
commitment to quantity, objectivity, fairness, and utility. Moreover, these commitments are not purely 
epistemic but have a distinctive moral dimension. Together they position psychometrics as an 
indispensable tool of a meritocratic society. What is the upshot of this argument? 
First of all, it shows a practical untenability of a certain version of the value-free ideal. For the 
sake of good research, this idea holds, moral values should not have a direct or indirect effect on any part 
of developing good knowledge (Reichenbach, 1951). Over the past decades, the value-free ideal has been 
disputed by several authors (Douglas, 2009; Betz, 2013; Elliott, 2017). Non-epistemic values are not only 
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inescapable but can even be defensible and desirable when made responsibly (Anderson, 2004). This 
point has not been made about psychometrics and we have shown that the four values are intimately 
linked with the practical goals of this field. So long as these goals persist, the incorporation of values is 
intrinsic to doing good research.   
It does not follow, however, that these values are immutable and that they can safely stay hidden; 
and this is the second upshot of our argument. Values in psychometrics need a systematic evaluation on 
ethical and epistemic grounds. To show value-ladenness and contingency of these values does not amount 
to a debunking of psychometrics. We resist strongly simplistic inferences to the moral depravity of 
psychometrics. However, we ring alarm bells about the moral aloofness and a certain blindness of 
psychometrics in order to start a conversation about improving this field. We have shown that there is a 
progressive element to each of the four values. The commitments to quantity, objectivity, fairness, and 
utility all respond to specific moral threats, namely they reject the idea that humans are qualitatively 
different and that any expert can use personal judgment to rank individuals. But these attractive aspects of 
psychometrics should be weighed against the less attractive ones, namely that psychometrics have 
contributed to other types of social unfairness or inequality. The emphasis on a strictly meritocratic 
society - though seemingly committed to fair treatment and equality - has its own dangers, which have 
been pointed out by several authors (Gordon & Terrell, 1981; Lemann, 1999; Sokal, 1987; Stein 2014). 
High test scores have become a more than desirable good in many societies; they are the gateway to 
receiving top-notch education and being successful in society. The technology of testing has not erased 
inequality, as some early psychometricians had hoped, but has become part of a social order that is not 
only determined by ability, but also by factors like socioeconomic status, geographic location, and access 
to education. There is now a “tyranny of merit” to use the words of Michael Sandel, and this regime is 
directly linked to deepening inequality, destruction of communities, and polarisation along economic and 
political lines all over the world (Sandel, 2020). Could there be a psychometrics that resists these trends 
or at least does not exacerbate them? What sort of psychometrics could support a different vision of 
success - one in which many forms of life are enabled and celebrated, not just getting to a top school or 
reaching the top tier in a ranking, however fair and objective the test? 
These are hard questions and we do not pretend to offer answers here. But our discussion does 
have clear implications for action. If psychometricians follow us in abandoning the value-free image of 
their work, then the natural next step is to ask whether each of the four values we identified are worth 
preserving. Should the assumption of a quantitative nature of variation be sometimes modified? Is 
objectivity as removal of personal judgment worth amending? Might there be a better conception of 
fairness? Should models be evaluated on their substantive virtues rather than utility alone and what even 
counts as utility worth pursuing? Answers to these questions do not have to be universal, which is why we 
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resist any sweeping recommendations. It is possible to suspend the quantitative assumption for some 
attributes but preserve it for others. It is also possible to expand the library of notions of fairness, 
objectivity, and utility, without committing to adoption of any single one of them always and everywhere. 
It is possible to ask for whom psychometric models should be useful, the educational testing industry or a 
wider set of stakeholders who might be harmed by the work these models do? In exploring these 
questions psychometricians should keep an eye on trade-offs between the values they wish to endorse. 
Not all values can be implemented in the same model and sacrifices are inevitable. This is why there is no 
sense in insisting on one particular set of values psychometrics should exemplify. It all depends on the 
context of a particular research project. 
Such a complex calculation of costs and benefits may come across as asking for too much, 
especially of researchers whose identity is often defined by not being ethicists, but we have already 
shown that this identity is misleading. Psychometrics is already knee-deep in values, so our proposal here 
is only to make this fact more explicit and more examined. The professional responsibility of the 
psychometrician is more significant than currently recognised and has to encompass reflections on 
whether the values that animate psychometrics today are the values that should animate psychometrics 
tomorrow. As we have argued in this paper, apparently technical concepts such as Differential Item 
Functioning and fairness acquire their meaning against a backdrop of usually implicit ideas on how a 
good test should function or how selection procedures should ideally operate. The background 
assumptions that guide these judgements of good and bad can be explicated to a much greater degree than 
is customary in contemporary approaches. This does not mean that psychometrics should seek a one-to-
one mapping of techniques to value systems, as any one technical concept can undoubtedly be applied in 
various value systems; rather, it is important to investigate the way that a technical concept 
operationalizes core values in such systems, in order to understand the role it plays in society. 
Psychometric tests and techniques are not used in isolation but typically serve a goal that is defined in 
larger societal structures that involve social, political, and moral value judgements. Developing 
connections to such larger structures should be an important topic on the agenda of both psychometrics 
and society at large. For example, it would be worthwhile to investigate encoding different value systems 
into concepts such as fairness and objectivity would play out in terms of the structure of psychometric 
models, and to what kind of tests the implementation of such structures would lead. In this respect, it is 
noteworthy that Georg Rasch (1960), one the towering figures in psychometrics, derived his models from 
philosophical assumptions on the qualities a good measurement system should have (i.e., item should be 
probabilistically invariant in ordering individuals, and individuals should be probabilistically invariant in 
ordering items). Most existing psychometric work has followed this lead, but that does not imply that no 
alternative courses of action are possible. These alternatives should be articulated and evaluated.  
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Finally, a word on limitations of the present study. We have hypothesized about value 
commitments of psychometricians as they appear in the published theoretical work in this field. However, 
we have not explored the full range of methods that could demonstrate these value commitments, nor did 
we address value judgements in all subfields of psychometrics (only in psychometrics narrowly defined). 
We therefore hope that this paper can be treated as a stepping stone for further studies on the topic. For 
example, a qualitative study could shed further light on the psychometrician's attitudes and their 
perception of value judgements in psychometrics, a discourse analysis on how values are embedded in the 
psychometrician’s language, and a sociological analysis could enlighten the psychometrician’s 
participation in public policy and the interconnection between psychometrics and more substantive areas. 
The bottomline is that values in psychometrics can be uncovered and scrutinised and doing so with all the 
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